Comparative Effectiveness Research: Medical Practice, Payments, and Politics: the Need to Retain Standards of Medical Research by Selker, Harry P.
EDITORIAL
Comparative Effectiveness Research: Medical Practice,
Payments, and Politics: the Need to Retain Standards
of Medical Research
Harry P. Selker, MD, MSPH
1,2
1Institute for Clinical Research and Health Policy Studies, Tufts Medical Center, Boston, MA, USA;
2Tufts Clinical and Translational Science
Institute, Tufts University, Boston, MA, USA.
J Gen Intern Med 24(6):776–8
DOI: 10.1007/s11606-009-0988-7
© Society of General Internal Medicine 2009
C
omparative effectiveness research (CER), once only the
scientific interest of clinical and health services
researchers who compared medical treaments, now has tum-
bled into the public arena. (
1) Facing the need for drastic
improvement in our nation’s healthcare delivery, Congress
and the Obama Administration are looking to CER to improve
and broaden the use of treatments in a cost-effective way.
Researchers, clinicians, professional societies, and policy
experts have welcomed this, as they see CER as a scientifically
rigorous way to select the most effective treatments for the
benefit of patients and the public. On the other hand, while
there has been support in the healthcare industry, apprehen-
sion has surfaced among those whose products would be
subject to evaluation of effectivness, including pharmaceuti-
cal, biotech, and medical device companies, and among those
who pay for treatments, including health plans, insurers, and
large employers. Such concerns have translated into intense
politics around CER—perhaps the best evidence that CER is
truly likely to change practice and payment for medical care.
This intensity also serves to remind us why, for CER, we must
retain the usual standards and structures for medical research.
Potential outcomes of CER include scientific knowledge,
improved health, and financial impact. (
2) In terms of science,
across the spectrum of CER, from structured analyses of prior
studies, databases, and registries, to the conduct of large
clinical effectiveness trials, the scientific objective is rigorous
reliable information about what treatments are best for what
patients, and under what circumstances. Unless the conduct
or public release of such research is compromised by poor
quality or conflicts of interest, such information should have a
direct positive impact on health.
The economic consequences are less direct. For the nation,
whatever the total costs of healthcare, CER should have a
positive impact on cost-effectiveness—we would be spending
healthcare dollars more wisely, on the most effective care, as
concluded by detailed analyses by the Congressional Budget
Office. (
3–5) However, for those who sell treatments, the
consequences are mixed. Pharmaceutical manufacturers may
benefit financially because CER will compare drugs to not only
other drugs, but also to medical devices and procedures, which
could expand the conditions for which their drugs might be
used, and thus would enlarge their market. However, some
new on-patent drugs may be found to be no more effective than
earlier off-patent versions already generically available at far
less cost, and this could compromise sales of their most
profitable drugs. Similarly, for medical device companies,
profits could be reduced. Because currently FDA’s statute
mandates less evidence of treatment benefit for medical
devices than for drugs, a new requirement for rigorous testing
of effectiveness would require extra time and money, and
ultimately likely would show that at least some devices have
undiscernable treatment benefits, which would curtail sales.
These adverse effects on manufacturers’ profits are the
other side of the coin that should result in greater cost-
effectiveness, which should be attractive to healthcare payers,
including insurers, self-insured companies, and the govern-
ment. Reliable well-accepted information on treatment effec-
tiveness on which to base payment decisions would be very
helpful. Moreover, that such information would be generated
without insurers using their own funds, and without violating
anti-trust rules against colluding with competitors about
business decisions, but rather using public funds, is very
attractive. However, the possibility that they may be mandated
to provide access to treatments found to be effective and that
their decision-making about payment would be potentially
limited, based on such data, is of concern.
These business concerns have generated political action.
While expressing general support for CER, industry interests
have conducted a two-pronged approach to alter CER legisla-
tion. First, they want to be sure that cost-effectiveness is not
part of CER. Manufacturers fear impediments to sales of their
most profitable products, and healthcare payers fear impedi-
ments to their healthcare coverage decisions. Manufacturers’
lobbyists have pressured Congressional offices involved in
healthcare policy that have included CER in proposed legisla-
tion, insisting that cost-effectiveness analyses be specifically
precluded from CER. Also, there has been a public campaign
to raise fears about CER intended to influence Congress. For
example, when in mid-February 2009 CER appeared likely to
be part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
commentary and editorials on Fox News, the Wall Street
Journal, and other outlets, and commentators such as Lou
Dobbs and Rush Limbaugh warned that CER would lead to
government restrictions in treatments based on cost, and that
old people would be denied all costly medical treatments under
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776a new “duty to die” regime meant to save money, a type of
government-mandated “Nazi-style euthanasia.” (
6–8) The 2-
year economic stimulus funding of CER was retained in this
legislation, but the discourse gave a sample of what might be in
store for the inclusion of CER in long-term healthcare reform.
Second, if CER is to be done, industry wants “stakeholder”
input into its conduct, and wants it not to be done at a current
Federal medical or healthcare research agency. What are the
alternatives? Currently, the private sector puts a relatively
small amount of financial resources toward CER, focused on
products or services of specific companies. The objectivity of
this research is suspect, and, as has become too evident
recently, results may be buried if not in concert with a
company’s objectives, even if they would have been helpful to
the healthcare system and the health of the public. In
comparison, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ), already mandated by law to do CER, and the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), where CER is also done, both have
long-standing high standards of research transparency and
disclosure, with results available for public scrutiny. The
credibility of these science agencies has led to acceptance of
their findings by the medical community and dissemination of
practice improvements, supporting improved care by all
clinicians and payers.
Despite this, business interests continue to press that CER
not be done in these research agencies, but in entities such as
a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC).
This would allow governing input by industry stakeholders,
and the entity would not be subject to the rules, regulations,
and laws that govern the conduct of science at federal research
agencies, and it would not be protected from political pressure.
(
1,9) Proponents of this approach state that AHRQ is vulnerable
to political influence, but the fact that the proposed alter-
natives are much more susceptible to industry influence
reveals the real concern about keeping CER with other
federally sponsored medical research in Federal research
agencies—the possibility of lack of outside influence. (Of note,
AHRQ’s predecessor agency was slated for elimination in 1997
after subgroups in the orthopedic community became upset
with a practice guideline it generated with regard to low back
pain treatment and found a Congressional champion to seek
elimination of the Agency. After that, wisely, the Agency
stopped creating practice guidelines, instead focusing on
compiling the evidence that others could use, the model for
CER in a science agency.) In conjunction with this, AHRQ,
currently the primary site for CER, has also been labeled as an
example of an inefficient government agency. However, creat-
ing a completely new entity and research infrastructure and
processes to replace what already is in place doing this work as
a highly respected science agency seems far less efficient; the
true objective seems something other than efficiency.
The stakes are very high—for industry, but also for the
nation and for the public. There is ample recent history of
industry influencing the public and government, and aborting
or greatly modifying healthcare legislation. (
10) There is a high
road, a road that has made the biomedical research of this
nation the best on the planet: the retention of the long-
developed peer-review processes and increasingly strict protec-
tions against conflicts of interest embedded in the operations
of the NIH, AHRQ, National Science Foundation (NSF), and
other Federal research agencies. On the other hand, industry
concern about CER being done in a Federal research agency
does have merit. Such research should generate information
that will help those who make healthcare payment coverage
decisions, and such research should not be restricted for
political reasons, but payment for treatments should not be
the purview of the science agencies—these decisions should be
made by other entities under the extant rules for healthcare
coverage. This leads to specific recommendations for the
conduct of CER:
(1) Comparative effectiveness research is research intended
to affect treatments of people, and for that reason, like all
biomedical research, it deserves to be done at the highest
standards of science and free from conflicts of interest. Thus, it
should be done at a science agency, not at a new hybrid entity
that will have to build an entirely new science infrastructure
and that will involve in its governance those with a direct stake
in the results. Indeed, the latter risks a situation rife with
conflict of interest and compromised scientific quality.
However, public input to the research agenda is a social
good, and should be sought. It is very reasonable that agencies
doing CER and healthcare research have a high-level public/
private advisory board. However, it must not be a governing
board, which would constitute an avenue for conflict of interest
that scientists, clinicians, policy-makers, and the public would
find objectionable.
The AHRQ has the most broad experience and expertise for
CER, and probably should be the lead agency for CER, but NIH
also has a very important role to play, and both are likely to
benefit from collaboration with the FDA, CDC, and other
agencies. For example, based on these agencies’ respective
expertise, AHRQ could be responsible for research looking at
effectiveness, harm, and safety done by analyses of current
evidence, healthcare databases, and healthcare delivery, and
NIH could be responsible for large randomized comparative
effectiveness trials needed to accurately assess benefits of a
treatment. A joint committee could coordinate these efforts,
much as there is currently cooperation among program staff
among the agencies for joint projects, and this would presum-
ably be synchronous with the newly appointed Federal Coor-
dinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research.
Also, this link may be facilitated by the NIH Clinical and
Translational Science Awards (CTSAs). With the mission of
promoting of the wide spectrum of research that can improve
the public’s health, many CTSA institutions already have
AHRQ CER centers [e.g., AHRQ Evidence-based Practice
Centers, AHRQ/FDA Centers for Education and Research
on Therapeutics, and AHRQ DeCIDE (Developing Evidence to
Inform Decisions about Effectiveness) Network centers], and
thus could be an excellent link to AHRQ around CER and a
portal to NIH Institutes and Centers, and potentially to other
agencies.
(2) Coverage decisions (or selective reimbursement and/or
differential cost sharing) should not be the purview of the
CER done at these research agencies; those decisions would
be made at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) and other payers, as they are now. Presumably this
will be addressed as part of the Healthcare Reform effort.
Assessments of the effectiveness of treatments should be
central to the output of CER; specific payment decisions
about issues of policy, cost, equity, compassionate care,
among many, should not be done in the research agencies.
(
10) This should be overseen by regulatory agencies under
long-established procedures.
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contained $1.1 billion for CER activities at AHRQ and NIH. It
was an excellent sign that the Government recognizes the
importance of CER, and that its proper home is in a science
agency, viz., AHRQ, in conjunction with NIH, where peer review
processes and research infrastructure are in place to ensure
the highest quality science. This will benefit the entire
healthcare system and the public through promoting more
effective care. As the impact CER might have on payments
plays out in politics, it is important for the nation and its
citizens that CER not be rent asunder from the rest of the
biomedical research enterprise. The opportunity to broaden
and improve medical practice for all deserves our best efforts.
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